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Not much has been written about a possible
Levinassian epistemology, most commentators
preferring to deal with Levinas’s ethics. There is
however a whole chapter dedicated to Levi-
nassian epistemology in Totality and Infinity.1 It
is titled “Truth and Justice.” Such a title however
can strike one as odd inasmuch as it seems to ar-
ticulate two seemingly distinct notions: justice
and truth. Indeed, the notion of justice seems to
pertain more specifically to the domain of ethics;
truth, on the other hand, pertains to the dimension
of epistemology. How then can Levinas make
such a connection? Levinas himself recognizes
the uncanniness of this association and asks:
“What is the relation between justice and truth?”
(TI 82). There seems to be no connection be-
tween the two concepts. Much more plausible
would be a connection between justification and
truth. Levinas recognizes that and yet, in the very
etymology of the concept of justification, he dis-
cerns an element of justice: “Truth is in effect not
separable from intelligibility; to know is not sim-
ply to record, but always to comprehend. We also
say that to know is to justify, making intervene,
by analogy with the moral order the notion of jus-
tice” (TI 82). And so justice does seem to take a
central place in the Levinassian epistemology
and is articulated here with the better-known
process of justification.
But, one does not yet understand the neces-
sary articulation Levinas makes between justifi-
cation and justice. Is not justification enough to
delimitate truth from error? Is not the whole pur-
pose of the scientific endeavor reduced to the act
of justification of knowledge? Such has been,
since Descartes, the traditional approach to truth.
Truth, to be such, must find justification in a
thinking subject. Thus, for Descartes, it is the
thinking subject which constitutes the ground,
the origin of any attempt at discovering the truth
of a given being.2 Knowledge originates in a
thinking subject exercising its freedom of discov-
ery, constitution, and justification. In this con-
text, knowledge is accessible only to a masterful
and dominating subject capable of offering
strong reasons for its beliefs, capable of justify-
ing itself in the face of often difficult odds. What
then of justice? Why is justice needed here in
order to ensure truth and knowledge? Why
articulate the ethical through the epistemo-
logical?
We shall see that, for Levinas, the connection
between justification and justice is, however,
fundamental. According to Levinas, the
grounded subject is not the original moment of
truth. Such a subject will always find itself prey
to the pitfall of solipsism. It is always in danger of
taking its own constructions for reality. What
stance must one then adopt in order to achieve a
genuine knowledge of being? According to
Levinas, justice is the stance that will bring a
given subjectivity the closest to discovering such
a genuine knowledge of being. A genuine access
to exteriority can emerge only, for Levinas, from
a subjectivity that has a sense for justice. But we
do not yet understand the connection between
justice and truth. Indeed, justice seems to be a no-
tion pertaining to the ethical or moral dimension.
What then does it have to do with the
epistemological quest for truth? What is here
then the connection between ethics and truth?
The purpose of this essay will be to show how
Levinas moves from a Cartesian epistemology
based on justification to an epistemology
founded on justice and, as such, indissociable
from ethics.
Truth and Justification
Truth as grounded in subjectivity, as a subjec-
tive endeavor or activity, was the essence of Des-
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cartes’s teaching. Contrary to a conception of
truth as existing outside of subjectivity, waiting
to be discovered, Descartes shows in his Dis-
course on Method that truth, i.e., the revelation,
the disclosure of being, cannot be thought apart
from an activity on the part of subjectivity, from
an act of judgment on its part. This is the first
principle of the Cartesian method: “To accept
nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize
to be so.”3 It is the subjective I, the ego, which is
the voucher for truth. Knowledge thus stems
from an activity of the I of recognition and of
acceptance of a given content as being true.
Thus, knowledge becomes relative to subjec-
tivity, as Levinas comments:
The knowledge of objects does not secure a rela-
tion whose terms would absolve themselves from
the relation. Though objective knowledge remains
disinterested, it is nevertheless marked by the way
the knowing being has approached the Real. To
recognize truth to be disclosure is to refer it to the
horizon of him who discloses. Plato, who identi-
fies knowledge with vision, stresses, in the myth of
the chariot of the Phaedrus, the movement of the
soul that contemplates truth and the relativeness of
truth to that course. The disclosed being is relative
to us and not kat auto. (TI 64)
The objectivity of a given knowledge does not
annul its intrinsic connection with subjectivity.
Indeed, it is subjectivity which remains the final
authority as to the objective quality of a given
knowledge. It is subjectivity which decides,
which determines what is real and what is not.
In this sense, while subjectivity does not con-
stitute the origin of truth—truth remains to be
found within being—it certainly constitutes its
ground, or foundation. It is from subjectivity that
an act of genuine knowing emerges, from its ac-
tivity and judgment. There can be no genuine ap-
prehension of being apart from this subjective ac-
tivity intent on detecting the truth hidden within
being. Levinas thus sees the quest for knowledge
as a “work eminently individual, which always,
as Descartes saw, comes back to the freedom of
the individual, atheism affirms itself as atheism”
(TI 89). Such a subjectivity freely disposes of its
powers, it is in charge, it is masterful in the face of
being working as an artisan of truth, wrenching it
from the muteness of being.4 It answers only to it-
self; it is “atheist,”5 that is, it answers to no one
else, it is alone in the world, answering to no
authority other than its own preoccupation and
quest for truth.
It is the structure of this quest—as a limitless
freedom and quest—which guides the scientific
method. Indeed, whereas the act of knowing was
considered by the Ancients as an unveiling or dis-
covery of being,6 it becomes with Descartes the
product of a subjective act of justification.
Levinas observes along those lines that “the justi-
fication of a fact consists in lifting from it its
character of being a fact, accomplished, past, and
hence irrevocable, which as such obstructs our
spontaneity” (TI 82). In other words, to justify
amounts to grasping, to “lifting” being out of its
irrevocability so as to ensure that it does not ob-
struct our spontaneity anymore. Essential to the
act of justification is thus the affirmation of the
self’s spontaneity. Thus, what comes first in the
Cartesian epistemological framework is not be-
ing but the self, for only the latter is able to en-
gage in the act of justification. Justification, un-
like the acts of unveiling or discovery, has thus a
strong subjective connotation. The intention of
knowledge thus takes the form of a struggle of the
self over and against anything outside of it
presenting an obstacle to its quest for knowledge.
A genuine encounter with exteriority must
then be assimilated to a battle of the heroic and
solitary self against incredible odds. Levinas de-
scribes thus this battle of the self:
In clarity an object which is first exterior is given,
that is, is delivered over to him who encounters it as
though it had been entirely determined by him. In
clarity the exterior being presents itself as the work
of the thought that receives it. Intelligibility, char-
acterized by clarity, is a total adequation of the
thinker with what is thought, in the precise sense of
a mastery exercised by the thinker upon what is
thought in which the object’s resistance as an exte-
rior being vanishes. (TI 123–24)
Knowledge emerging from the act of justifica-
tion thus necessitates the overcoming of obsta-
cles or odds to the self’s quest for intelligibility.
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Justification implies a mastery of the self over the
“object’s resistance.” Whatever was deemed as a
resistance, an obstacle to the self’s quest for
knowledge, must be overcome in the self’s act of
justification.
Intelligibility of a given being thus emerges
from an act of violence on the part of the self. It
must be wrenched from being; it must be upheld
against competing paradigms. Levinas speaks of
an act of “mastery” on the part of subjectivity:
This mastery is total and as though creative; it is ac-
complished as a giving of meaning: the object of
representation is reducible to noemata. The intelli-
gible is precisely what is entirely reducible to
noemata and all of whose relations with the under-
standing reducible to those established by the light.
. . . Descartes’s clear and distinct idea manifests it-
self as true and as entirely immanent to thought:
entirely present, without anything clandestine; its
very novelty is without mystery. (TI 124)
Intelligibility is therefore the product of an act of
mastery on the part of the self, an act of creation
which, out of the indistinctiveness of being,
speaks to the meaning of a truth. Knowledge con-
stitutes in this passage a triumph of light over
darkness, of word over matter. It allows for no
part of “mystery” or of “clandestinity.” Light
must triumph, meaning it must be established
over the darkness and muteness of being.
Knowledge shines forth as the result of com-
plete mastery on the part of the subject. Justifica-
tion is symptomatic of a subjectivity that has
shown itself victorious, masterful over difficult
odds. Such a subjectivity adopts the stance of the
demiurge, who has all power over reality, and
whose word wrenches light from the darkness: as
Levinas observes, “There is an absolute, creative
freedom, prior to the venturesome course of the
hand which chances on to the goal it seeks” (TI
124). In this sense, truth as justification emerges
from a subjectivity whose position in the world is
one of mastery and centrality. Truth as justifica-
tion is grounded in a subjectivity who has shown
itself capable of holding on to its vision in the
face of alien obstacles and threats and of remain-
ing unmoved by opposition—be it that of being
or of competing scientific paradigms. Subjectiv-
ity thus “holds its ground” in the face of external
opposition. It is in this sense that one must under-
stand Descartes’ understanding of truth as
emerging from a solitary subject and all
philosophy as “egology” (TI 44), in the Levinas-
sian sense of the term.
This egology, however, poses a number of
problems. One may wonder how a genuine dis-
covery of alterity is possible from an egological
stance, from a subjectivity defined by its central-
ity and which sees itself as “master and pos-
sessor” of the world.7 Is truth as justification the
best way? Does an act of knowing structured as
the self’s affirmation of its views and hypotheses
still allow for an unveiling of alterity, of some-
thing exterior to the self? Can exteriority emerge
from interiority? Does truth find its ultimate
ground in subjectivity? This is precisely the
Levinassian critique of a knowledge emerging
from a grounded self and discovered by means of
justification: “Absolute experience is not disclo-
sure; to disclose on the basis of a subjective hori-
zon is already to miss the noumenon” (TI 67).
According to Levinas, an experience of otherness
which is absolute, that is, which reveals otherness
as such, cannot be coined as disclosure, that is, by
an elucidating activity of the self. Alterity will
not, according to Levinas, be disclosed; it does
not reveal itself through an act of mastery and
domination on the part of the self: “For truth is
neither in seeing nor in grasping” (TI 172). On
the contrary, alterity is neutralized by such an act
of mastery; it dissolves at the contact of a domi-
nating self. The mastering self only has access to
the “phenomenon,” that is, to the product of its
own constitution and perceptions. But it has no
access, according to Levinas, to the “noumenon,”
that is, to the thing in itself, to the being as such,
in itself.8 Alterity does not lend itself to an
approach structured as domination and mastery.
Such an approach is termed by Levinas “on-
tology.” Ontology translated as “discourse on be-
ing,” must be understood in the Levinassian
sense as the meaning, the logos, that the dominat-
ing self extracts, with a necessary violence,9 from
being. According to Levinas, however, such a vi-
olence, such an ontology, which emerges from an
activity, a spontaneity on the part of the self, can
never get to the true reality, to genuine exteriori-
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ty: “Ontology, which reduces the other to the
same, promotes freedom—the freedom that is
the identification of the same, not allowing itself
to be alienated by the other. Here theory enters
upon a course that renounces metaphysical De-
sire, renounces the marvel of exteriority from
which that Desire lives” (TI 42). The act of ontol-
ogy, in its quest to understand, to elucidate, com-
prehend being, amounts for Levinas to a neutral-
ization of otherness. One might wonder,
however, as to why the quest to understand being
amounts to a dissolution of the alterity of being.
Does not the effort to understand being, on the
contrary, reveal this being to us and to itself?
According to Levinas, there is nothing wrong
with seeking to approach being and alterity in or-
der to encounter it. But this approach must occur
in a certain mode if it is to correctly approach oth-
erness. It cannot be a masterful or dominating ap-
proach. This approach, which Levinas terms
“freedom”—in that it privileges the self over the
other—does not constitute the proper approach
to alterity. Such an approach is not concerned
with the other; it is primarily concerned with the
self and its personal agenda. Here Levinas ac-
knowledges that the self is never completely dis-
interested in its quest for truth.10 There is often, at
the basis, of a given quest, the need for the self to
affirm itself rather than to genuinely seek to know
a given being. The quest for truth becomes in
such a context a power struggle of a self seeking
to affirm itself, its world view, its status as a sci-
entist, before a given community. Such a power
struggle stems not from a genuine interest in
knowledge but in the economic, political, and
ideological interests of the self.11 Such a self will
never genuinely approach exteriority, according
to Levinas, but has renounced “metaphysical De-
sire,” that is the genuine and disinterested thirst
for truth which alone allows the “marvel of exte-
riority” (TI 42) to be revealed. Thus, the quest for
truth as justification, as seeking the affirmation
of the self, never truly engages in the journey to-
wards otherness, but, like Ulysses, ultimately al-
ways comes back home to the self’s interests and
agendas: “For the transcendence of thought re-
mains closed in itself despite all its adventures—
which in the last analysis are purely imaginary, or
are adventures traversed as by Ulysses: on the
way home” (TI 27). The self that practices ontol-
ogy ultimately remains with itself, with its own
constructions and productions. Such a self has
firmly established itself in the face of
overwhelming odds, has “stood its ground,” but
in so doing, has distanced itself from the truth.
This was, incidentally, Descartes’s problem.
Having founded the quest for truth on an activity
of the self, Descartes himself came to wonder
whether such an approach would not bypass ex-
teriority altogether and leave the self with noth-
ing but the product of its own imagination. For
Descartes, the self’s constitution of reality would
never escape the looming doubt that perhaps it
was all a construction and that perhaps the self
was fooling itself in thinking that his perception
of reality coincided with being itself:
On first contact the phenomenon would degrade
into appearance and in this sense would remain in
equivocation, under the suspicion of an evil ge-
nius. The evil genius does not manifest himself to
state the lie; he remains, as possible, beyond things
which all seem to manifest themselves for good.
The possibility of their fall to the state of images or
veils co-determines their apparition as pure specta-
cle, and betrays the recess that harbors the evil ge-
nius; whence the possibility of universal doubt,
which is not a personal adventure that happened to
Descartes. (TI 90)
The quest for truth as justification, as an affirma-
tion of the self, is always prone, according to
Descartes, to the doubt that perhaps the self’s
findings are nothing but the product of its own
imagination. The world which emerges from the
self’s justifications, may be nothing but an illu-
sion of the self, an image conveyed by the self.
Thus indissociable from the act of justification is
the doubt that perhaps it is all a grand illusion.
The self’s affirmation of a given knowledge re-
mains shrouded in the doubt that perhaps what it
has found does not correspond to reality in itself.
Thus doubt constitutes the first time the self
encounters an obstacle in its quest for justifica-
tion. Doubt erects a wall of opacity between the
self and the light of truth which it seeks and, as
such, can only be seen in a negative light, as an
evil that must be done away with. Descartes per-
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sonifies this doubt as an “evil genius.”12 The
doubt that Descartes feels accompanies the quest
for intelligibility is not something positive; it
stems from an evil that must be somehow over-
come. It is the concept of an “evil” genius which
is for Descartes at the origin of doubt. Such a
view on doubt has been that of the entire scien-
tific community from Descartes on. In this, Des-
cartes profoundly differs from the Ancients,
who, on the contrary, situated wonder, the capac-
ity to wonder, to be perplexed and curious, at the
origin of the scientific endeavor.13 Descartes also
gives wonder, or doubt and questions, their place,
but as a necessary evil which must be overcome.
With Descartes, doubt becomes the ultimate en-
emy of truth. It casts a shadow on the glorious
and noble quest for knowledge. It signifies the
limitations of the self’s spontaneity, places a
huge obstacle in its quest and must be ultimately
overcome. And as such, doubt puts into question
the self’s epistemological stance. A self in prey to
doubt is a self that is no more at home in its
world-view; it is a self which feels a certain un-
canniness within its prior stance, a self in danger
of losing its footing, its ground in the scientific
community. Thus doubt is perceived as a terrible
obstacle that must be overcome, as a “scandal”
within the scientific endeavor. Levinas com-
ments: “The spontaneity of freedom is not called
in question; its limitation alone is held to be tragic
and to constitute a scandal” (TI 83). As such,
doubt is seen as a menacing obstacle to be reck-
oned with, as a negative foe to be resisted again in
the quest for foundations. Doubt casts a shadow
on the self’s credibility, on the strength of its
position within the scientific world; it must be
overcome, done away with, dissipated.
But must doubt necessarily be seen as an
“evil” to be overcome? Can we not see doubt as
an awakening of the self to its arbitrary freedom
and to the dangers of solipsism that such a free-
dom entails? We shall see that, for Levinas, doubt
is positive;14 it is the first moment when the self’s
solipsistic bubble is put into question, where the
self’s mastery of the world is questioned. This,
for Levinas, marks the end of a definition of sub-
jectivity as the ground for truth and the beginning
of its exile away from all of its own certainties
and world-view. Interestingly, we shall see that
the exilic journey of doubt does not signify the
dissolution of the enterprise of knowledge, inas-
much as it allows an opening of the self to a di-
mension of otherness, constitutes the beginning
of a more genuine epistemological approach—of
the discovery of a genuine exteriority un-consti-
tuted by the self. We shall see that, in this sense,
far from occulting the quest for knowledge, the
exilic journey of doubt paves the way to truth. As
Levinas puts it: “It is because it suspects that it is
dreaming itself that it awakens. The doubt makes
it seek certainty. But this suspicion, this con-
sciousness of doubt, implies the idea of the Per-
fect” (TI 86). Thus, for Levinas, the exilic mo-
ment of doubt is a positive experience which
makes possible an “awakening” on the part of the
self. But what is the nature of this “awakening”?
And how does this awakening imply the “idea of
the Perfect”? What is meant here by the “idea of
the Perfect”?
Truth and Justice
Far from facilitating the quest for knowledge,
we have seen that a grounded subjectivity, intent
on justifying itself, can easily bypass the encoun-
ter with reality in itself. A subjectivity that gives
free reign to its spontaneity, to its activity cannot,
according to Levinas, encounter alterity or other-
ness. For alterity does not lend itself to an ap-
proach of domination or mastery. But what kind
of stance must subjectivity then adopt in order to
genuinely encounter otherness? We shall see that
subjectivity can only encounter exteriority by let-
ting go of its centrality in the world and adopting
an exilic stance. The path of justification,
whereby subjectivity “holds its ground” within
the scientific world, must be relinquished for the
path of justice.15 But we do not yet understand
this connection between justice and knowledge.
What connection can there possibly be between
the ethical quest for justice and the epistemo-
logical endeavor of the search for truth. Levinas
himself recognizes this problem and poses him-
self the question: “What is the relation between
justice and truth?” (TI 82). How does the concern
for justice prepare one for the quest for truth?
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In order to answer these questions, we must
first gain a renewed understanding of what a gen-
uine encounter with exteriority consists in. We
must first understand whether exteriority is en-
countered solely through an activity on the part
of subjectivity, or if a moment of receptivity, of
respect on the part of subjectivity with regards to
the otherness of what is approached, is also nec-
essary. In other words, does knowledge originate
in a subjective activity, or, on the contrary, in re-
ceptivity to an otherness which precedes all sub-
jective activity? We shall see that, for Levinas,
exteriority does not reveal itself to a subjectivity
which affirms itself in the face of alterity, but, far
to the contrary, to a subjectivity willing to let its
spontaneity be interrupted by this very alterity.
The question remains, however, as to how this in-
terruption takes place in a subjectivity which a
priori is only concerned with itself and with the
affirmation of its world-view.
Far from defining the quest for knowledge as
an activity derived from the spontaneity of a sub-
jectivity, Levinas describes the encounter with
exteriority as a stance on the part of subjectivity
which allows for the alterity of the known to re-
main, which “lets the known being manifest it-
self” (TI 42). A genuine approach of the exteri-
ority of a being thus protects the otherness of the
known being and does not taint it with precon-
ceptions or a priori conceptualizations on the part
of subjectivity.16 The quest for knowledge must
do away, according to Levinas, with a priori cate-
gorizations and become a posteriori: Pure recep-
tivity to the revelation of an other, or, as Levinas
puts, untainted “desire” to know.17 The correct
stance of a subjectivity seeking truth is precisely
this: that it seek, that it “desire” it. The activity of
subjectivity, its spontaneity, must reside in desir-
ing knowledge and not in constituting or produc-
ing it. Such a knowledge will be no more the
product of a subjective activity, but “metaphysi-
cal,” that is, exterior to the world constituted by
subjectivity; it will not originate in subjectivity,
but originate from beyond its scope, from
exteriority.
Such a stance, which protects the alterity of
the known being, is described by Levinas as “re-
spectful”:
Knowledge or theory designates first a relation
with being such that the knowing being lets the
known being manifest itself while respecting its
alterity and without marking it in any way what-
ever by this cognitive relation. In this sense meta-
physical desire would be the essence of theory. (TI
42)
The stance of respect thus implies a limitation on
the natural freedom and spontaneity of subjectiv-
ity:
The famous suspension of action that is said to
make theory possible depends on a reserve of free-
dom, which does not abandon itself to its drives, to
its impulsive movements, and keeps its distances.
Theory, in which truth arises, is the attitude of a be-
ing that distrusts itself. Knowledge becomes
knowing of a fact only if it is at the same time criti-
cal, if it puts itself into question, goes back beyond
its origin—in an unnatural movement to seek
higher than one’s own origin, a movement which
evinces or describes a created freedom. (TI 82-83)
Genuine objectivity, which allows for the known
being to exist independently of subjective whims
and desires, is born, according to Levinas, from
this “reserve of freedom” on the part of subjectiv-
ity. Such a reserve is fundamental if the known
being is to be known as such and not merely as a
construction of subjectivity. Interestingly, the at-
titude of subjectivity is in this context no more
that of justification but of distrust of itself.18 Sub-
jectivity is no more intent in justifying itself, but
distrusts itself19 and, in so doing, allows for exte-
riority to escape its constitutive grasp and reveal
itself as it is in itself.
This distrust is, however, profoundly unnatu-
ral for a subjectivity hereto defined as master and
possessor of the world. Levinas thus speaks of a
“conversion” of subjectivity to exteriority: “The
conversion of the soul to exteriority, to the abso-
lutely other, to Infinity, is not deducible from the
very identity of the soul, for it is not commensu-
rate with the soul” (TI 61). Indeed, natural sub-
jectivity is not intent on respecting otherness or
letting it be. It is intent on affirming itself and its
world-view in the face of that otherness.20 As
such, it is not naturally disposed to encountering
genuine otherness. A “conversion of the soul” is
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thus, according to Levinas, necessary. The ques-
tion remains, however, as to what event is to bring
about such a conversion. If subjectivity is not nat-
urally bent on letting otherness reveal itself, what
brings about such a change of heart? What makes
this conversion possible?
According to Levinas, such an awakening
cannot come from within the act of knowledge,
for the latter depends itself on such an awaken-
ing, on such a conversion. Indeed, this conver-
sion, this calling into question of the self’s free-
dom and spontaneity, which allows for the very
concept of exteriority to emerge, is necessary for
the encounter with truth to be even conceivable:
“Knowledge as a critique, as a tracing back to
what precedes freedom, can arise only in a being
that has an origin prior to its origin—that is cre-
ated” (TI 85). According to Levinas, the quest for
knowledge can only emerge from a subjectivity
which already has a sense of exteriority, of other-
ness. Such a subjectivity, according to Levinas, is
“created.” It has a sense of an exteriority outside
of its world, of a transcendent being. Only such a
sense of otherness can give to subjectivity its
thirst for knowledge, can kindle in it the desire to
know and to encounter something other than it-
self. The question remains, however, as to how
this sense of otherness can emerge in a
subjectivity heretofore entirely self-absorbed.
Already Descartes struggled with this ques-
tion and appealed to the idea of Infinity as that
which, from within subjectivity itself, signified
towards a dimension transcendent to itself. Ac-
cording to Descartes, only the idea of Infinity,
which in turn testified to the existence of God,
could dispel the doubt uttered by the “evil ge-
nius.”21 For Descartes, then, the discovery of be-
ing as such, and not as a product of subjectivity,
could only be possible through the intervention
of the idea of the Infinite. It is the idea of the Infi-
nite —as it testified to the existence of a God who
would never deceive his creatures—which gave
the seal of exteriority to being and salvaged it
from being a mere hoax or illusion in the mind of
the self.22 Thus, the idea of the Infinite enables an
awakening of the self to being as such, to a
dimension outside of itself, to transcendence.
It is precisely this “idea of the Perfect” (TI 86)
that Levinas will reclaim from Descartes in order
to describe the awakening of the self to being as
such. But what will Levinas mean here by “the
Perfect”? Does the “idea of the Perfect” or of the
Infinite also signify God for Levinas?
According to Levinas, the Cartesian Infinite is
not an abstract and formal being of which the self
has a peculiar intuition. This Infinite, this un-
knowable and transcendent dimension can be
found within the realm of being, in the concrete
person of the other, in the face of the other: “The
exposition of the ethical signification of tran-
scendence and of the Infinite beyond being can
be worked out beginning with the proximity of
the neighbor and my responsibility for the other”
(TI 141). And indeed, the Cartesian Infinity and
the face of the other as described by Levinas pres-
ent a fundamental commonality: they both mani-
fest themselves as transcending, as “overflow-
ing” the sphere of subjectivity: “To approach the
Other in conversation is to welcome his expres-
sion, in which at each instant he overflows the
idea a thought would carry away from it. It is
therefore to receive from the Other beyond the
capacity of the I, which means exactly: To have
the idea of infinity” (TI 51). The face of the other
thus resembles the Cartesian Infinite in its capac-
ity to overflow the sphere of subjectivity. Just like
the Cartesian Infinite overflowed the sphere of
subjectivity, thereby showing the limitations of
its activities of mastery and possession, the other
disturbs subjectivity and puts into question the
centrality of its epistemological stance.
We have seen in our first chapter how the other
appears within the realm of the self as an inter-
ruption of the self’s grasp on the world. It is the
self’s encounter with the other, with a human
face, which according to Levinas marks the origi-
nal interruption of the self’s spontaneity: “It is
the welcoming of the Other, the commencement
of moral consciousness, which calls into ques-
tion my freedom” (TI 84). When faced with the
other, the self realizes the limits of its spontane-
ity; it realizes that it is not alone in the world and
that the other has an equal claim on that world.
For the first time, the self finds itself in the pres-
ence of the genuine exteriority of a being which
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refuses to be encompassed or subjected to the
self. For the first time, the self learns the limits of
its spontaneity and apprehends a being exterior to
itself. This awakening to exteriority can, in turn,
inform the way that the self had here to appre-
hend the world and give it a renewed sensitivity
to the otherness of that world. Instead of situating
itself as master and possessor of the world, the
self now hesitates in the face of the world.
And it is precisely in this hesitation that
Levinas situates the genuine access to exteriority.
For it is this hesitation which, according to
Levinas, allows for an apprehension of being as
such and not merely as the product of its own
spontaneity:
But theory understood as a respect for exteriority
delineates another structure essential for meta-
physics. In its comprehension of being (or ontol-
ogy) it is concerned with critique. It discovers the
dogmatism and naive arbitrariness of its spontane-
ity, and calls into question the freedom in such a
way as to turn back at every moment to the origin
of the arbitrary dogmatism of this free exercise. . . .
Its critical intention then leads it beyond theory and
ontology: critique does not reduce the other to the
same as does ontology, but calls into question the
exercise of the same. (TI 43)
Genuine knowledge—understood as “respect for
exteriority”—can only come about when subjec-
tivity has learned to hesitate before the world,
that is, to be critical of itself and distrustful of it-
self. But this self-criticism and mistrust, this self-
induced interruption of its spontaneity is not in-
nate to the self. It has to be taught by an other.
We now better understand how the journey to-
wards knowledge is “bound up with the social re-
lation, which is justice” (TI 72).23 For without
justice, whereby the self’s spontaneity finds it-
self limited by the presence of the other, there can
be no knowledge, that is, no apprehension of ex-
teriority as such. In this sense, the other precedes
the self in its epistemological quest and teaches it
something it did not know before: the limitation
of its spontaneity which is the beginning of re-
spect. Exteriority reveals itself only at the price of
such a contraction on the part of the self, whereby
the self experiences its limitations in the face of
exteriority. But this contraction on the part of the
self cannot emerge from the self’s own innate ca-
pacities. It is brought about by the other. This is
why for Levinas the beginning of justice lies in
“recognizing in the Other my master” (TI 72).
The initiation to exteriority is possible only at the
price of a de-centering of the self, whereby the
other is recognized as “master” (TI 72), as the
one who chastises the self, who interrupts its
spontaneity, who teaches it the narrow way of
justice. Only such a self is capable of respect, of
apprehending being as such.
Justice thus plays out this contraction, this ex-
ile of the self interrupted by an other. The just self
is thus not, according to Levinas, master and pos-
sessor the world. It is a self capable of being in-
terrupted and dislodged by an other, of losing its
prior foothold and stance. It is therefore no more
a grounded self, affirming and justifying itself in
the face of alterity which paves the way to truth,
but a de-centered self, exiled from its central
place in the world, dislodged by a “master”
greater than it and who teaches him the rigorous
way of justice, which is found, by Levinas, to be
the more apt seeker. The quest for knowledge can
only be lived by a broken self, by a self that has
put aside all desire for self-affirmation and mas-
tery. Exteriority will not be accessed by a
grounded self, seeking a secure position in the
world, but by a self capable of justice and willing
to be exiled, willing to suffer a “loss of its
wings,”24 willing to endure a limitation on its
spontaneity by the other.25 Only such a self will
be able to see beyond its own categorizations and
agendas and become capable of adopting a
respectful stance enabling it to apprehend being
as such.
But justice implies far more than a mere limi-
tation of the self by the other. This limitation of
the self is not performed per se, but with the ob-
jective of creating a space for an other to exist
side-by-side with the self. The narrow way of jus-
tice thus opens upon the social relation and to all
the new possibilities which go along with it. The
Levinassian definition of justice thus eventually
leads back to the creation of a space where the
self and the other both can exist, affirm them-
selves and be heard. In this sense, justice as a lim-
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itation on the self, as a straight and narrow way, in
no way impoverishes the self. Far to the contrary,
it opens, within the world of the self, a space for
the other to be, to exist and to be heard. This wel-
coming of others in the world of the self, in turn,
enriches the quest for knowledge. According to
Levinas, genuine exteriority can only appear in
the presence of another; it is never a solitary
quest. Levinas goes as far as to say that “the Other
is the principle of phenomena” (TI 92). But what
does this mean? Why does exteriority not appear
to a solitary subject? We have seen that the other
was needed to teach the self to doubt, to critique
and to curve its spontaneity. Only a self capable
of exercising self-doubt is able, according to
Levinas, to discover being as such and not as the
product of its spontaneity. Is this not lesson
enough? Can the doubtful and self-distrustful
self not proceed on its own in the quest for truth?
Why is the other still needed for the revealing of
phenomena?
It is here that Levinas is closest to his prede-
cessor Husserl. According to Husserl, the other
does not only place a limit to the self’s spontane-
ity, as shown by Levinas, but expands the self’s
horizons to encompass being in its entirety. A
given object, according to Husserl, has an infinity
of facets, an infinity of Abschattungen, or sides.26
The self, exercising its perspective, can only see
one of these facets depending on where it is
standing with regard to the object. The self thus
only has an incomplete vision of being, limited to
its own standpoint and place in the world. An
other, however, standing in a different place, and
seeing from a different perspective, would en-
counter a whole new set of facets of the given be-
ing, thus enriching the self’s perspective. Yet an-
other other would add to this vision, and so forth.
Thus, given the structure of the phenomenal-
ization of being—in facets—truth is necessarily
inter-subjective.27 It is only together that we can
come, according to Husserl, to a full vision of the
given object.
We now understand better Levinas’ claim that
the other “is at the commencement of experi-
ence” (TI 93). The other does not only exercise a
limitative effect on the self, but also enriches the
self’s experience with its own perspective. Genu-
ine exteriority is thus never to be encountered
alone, but results from an openness to others and
to their perspectives. Truth is thus never the pos-
session of a given self. It does not reveal itself to a
grounded and masterful self. Rather, it surren-
ders to a broken self, to a self which realizes its
limitations, which profoundly distrusts itself at
the contact of an other. Yet, the presence of this
other does not impoverish the self, but enriches it,
brings in his or her own perspective on being,
thus bringing the self closer to a full apprehen-
sion of being. The exile of the self thus does not
limit the self’s world, but enables a hospitality of
the self to the other, a welcoming by the self of
the other, which in turn enriches the quest for
knowledge.
Knowledge thus gives itself to a self capable
not only of exile but of hospitality. We are here
reminded of Socrates’ definition of the wise as a
stranger.28 Truth itself is not at home in the world;
it is itself exiled and in need of hospitality. Only a
self capable of receiving the stranger, capable of
receiving that which does not fit a certain para-
digm or a certain agenda, and as such, capable of
justice, will be able to apprehend truth. Accord-
ing to Levinas, “in the welcoming of the face the
will opens to reason” (TI 219). Levinas under-
stands here reason in its etymological sense of
legere, to connect, to link. In this sense, there can
be no rational discourse, no epistemological dis-
course without a sense of connection between the
self and the other, without a proximity between
the self and the other wherein the self welcomes
the other, the uniqueness of his or her perspective
and world-view. Exteriority will only give itself
to an inclusive and just discourse, to a discourse
which gives voice to alternative approaches and
perspectives.29 Only an infinity of perspectives
can enable an approach of being as such. Being
offers itself to a diversity and multiplicity of ap-
proaches30 and not to a single method or mode of
knowing. Alternative approaches to being are of-
ten shunned in a given scientific community. We
learn here, however, that these voices must also
be heard31 if being is to be approached in its integ-
rity. Equality must be given to these voices. Jus-
tice must be done to these voices too often and
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too long ignored if exteriority is ever to be
approached.
We now understand better how the journey to-
wards knowledge passes through the demands of
justice. It is not, according to Levinas, the
grounded and self-confident self, master and
possessor of its turf and capable of justification,
which can approach truth. Such a self is too en-
grossed in itself to acquire the proper respect nec-
essary to the discovery of being as such. It is, on
the contrary, a self which has allowed the other to
interrupt its spontaneity, and as such, a self awak-
ened to the demands of justice which, according
to Levinas, will be able to approach exteriority in
a genuine way. Only such a self is capable, ac-
cording to Levinas, of welcoming that exteriority
unto itself, of welcoming that which is not itself,
that which is beyond itself unto itself. The way to
truth thus passes through justice, for only a self
which has developed a keen sensitivity to other-
ness will show itself capable of respecting the
otherness of that which it is investigating in the
quest for truth. It is in this sense that, in the words
of Elizabeth Minnich, one must work for justice
if one is to encounter truth.
NOTES
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1. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay
on Esteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1969).
2. In his Discourse on Method, Descartes explicitly sit-
uates the ego as the foundation of truth. The first
principle which was to guide the quest for truth was
indeed to “to accept nothing as true which I did not
clearly recognize to be so: that is to say, carefully to
avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments and to
accept in them nothing more than what was pre-
sented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I
could have no occasion to doubt it.” Rene Descartes,
Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Phi-
losophy, ed. David Weismann (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996), 13.
3. Ibid.
4. Heidegger mentions this difficult, even violent,
wrenching of truth from being in his commentary on
Antigone: “It is this breaking out and breaking up,
capturing and subjugating that opens up the essent as
sea, as earth, as animal. It happens only insofar as the
powers of language, of understanding, of tempera-
ment, and of building are themselves mastered in vi-
olence. The violence of poetic speech, of thinking
projection, of building configuration, of the action
that creates states is not a function of faculties that
man has, but a taming and ordering of powers by vir-
tue of which the essent opens up as such when man
moves into it.” Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to
Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1959), 157.
5. Levinas understands “atheism” as the capacity of
subjectivity to take a solitary stance against any
heterogenous influence: “One can call atheism this
separation so complete that the separated being
maintains itself in existence all by itself, without par-
ticipating in the Being from which it is separated. . . .
The soul, the dimension of the psychic, being an ac-
complishment of separation, is naturally atheist. By
atheism we thus understand a position prior to both
the negation and the affirmation of the divine, the
breaking with participation by which the I posits it-
self as the same and as I” (Totality and Infinity), 58.
6. Heidegger explicates the Greek conception of truth
as an unveiling of being versus a purely subjective
construction in these terms: “The true as such is
essent. This means: the power that manifests itself
stands in unconcealment. In showing itself, the un-
concealed as such comes to stand” (An Introduction
to Metaphysics, 102).
7. Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on
First Philosophy, 38.
8. This distinction between phenomenon and
noumenon comes from Kant, who, before Levinas,
had already showed that while the act of knowledge
can come to know the phenomenon—the thing as it
appears—this act always, necessarily misses the
noumenon—the thing in itself. Critique of Pure Rea-
son, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapoli: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1996), 303–22.
9. Derrida comments on this necessary violence of dis-
course as follows: “Discourse, therefore, if it is origi-
nally violent, can only do itself violence, can only ne-
gate itself in order to affirm itself, make war upon the
war which institutes it without ever being able to
reappropriate this negativity, to the extent that it is
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discourse. Necessarily without reappropriating it,
for if it did so, the horizon of peace would disappear
into the night (worst violence as previolence). This
secondary war, as the avowal of violence, is the least
possible violence, the only way to repress the worst
violence, the violence of primitive and prelogical si-
lence, of an unimaginable night which would not
even be the opposite of day, an absolute violence
which would not even be the opposite of nonvio-
lence, nothingness or pure non-sense. Thus dis-
course chooses itself violently in opposition to noth-
ingness or pure non-sense, and, in philosophy
against nihilism.” Jacques Derrida, “Violence and
Metaphysics,” in Writing and Difference (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1977), 130.
10. Alison Jaggar speaks to that effect of the “myth of
dispassionate investigation”: “When hypotheses are
to be tested, however, positivist epistemology im-
poses the much stricter logic of justification. The
core of this logic is replicability, a criterion believed
capable of eliminating or cancelling out what are
conceptualized as emotional as well as evaluative bi-
ases on the part of individual investigators . . . but if,
as has been argued, the positivist distinction between
discovery and justification is not viable, then such a
distinction is incapable of filtering out values in sci-
ence. For example, although such a split, when built
into the Western scientific method, is generally suc-
cessful in neutralizing the idiosyncratic or unconven-
tional values of individual investigators, it has been
argued that it does not, indeed, cannot eliminate gen-
erally accepted social values. . . . Despite its classical
antecedents and as in the ideal of disinterested in-
quiry, the ideal of dispassionate inquiry is an impos-
sible dream.” “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in
Feminist Epistemology,” Inquiry 32 (June 1989):
161–63.
11. Jaggar identifies this tendency for self-affirmation as
constitutive of Western male-dominated scientific
investigation: “It is claimed with increasing fre-
quency that the modern Western conception of sci-
ence, which identifies knowledge with power and
views it as a weapon for dominating nature, reflects
the imperialism, racism, and misogyny of the
socities that created it. Several feminist theorists
have argued that modern epistemology itself may be
viewed as an expression of certain emotions alleged
to be especially characteristic of males in certain pe-
riods, such as separation anxiety and paranoia or an
obsession with control and fear of contamination”
(ibid., 163–63).
12. Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on
First Philosophy, 62.
13. Heidegger begins his essay on metaphysics with a
reference to the Greek sense of wonder which, at the
sight of being, asks simply: “why are there essents
rather than nothing?” (An Introduction to Metaphys-
ics, 1).
14. C. S. Peirce also recognizes this positive aspect of
doubt and sees in it the beginning of all sincere scien-
tific inquiry: “The irritation of doubt causes a strug-
gle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle
Inquiry, though it must be admitted that this is some-
times not a very apt designation. The irritation of
doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle
to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our be-
liefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so
as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make
us reject every belief which does not seem to have
been so formed as to insure this result. But it will
only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that be-
lief. With the doubt therefore the struggle begins, and
with the cessation of doubt it ends.” “The Fixation of
Belief,” in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1960), 231–32.
15. This passage from justification to justice is itself im-
plied in the process of justification as Levinas com-
ments: “Truth is in effect not separable from intelligi-
bility; to know is not simply to record, but always to
comprehend. We also say that to know is to justify,
making intervene, by analogy with the moral order,
the notion of justice” (Totality and Infinity, 82).
16. Bacon speaks of four such preconceptions suscepti-
ble of tainting human knowledge, which he terms
idols: “There are four kinds of illusions which block
men’s minds. For instructions’s sake we have given
them the following names: The first kind are called
idols of the tribe; the second, idols of the cave; the
third, idols of the marketplace; the fourth, idols of the
theater. . . . Idols of the tribe are founded in human
nature itself and in the very tribe or race of mankind.
... Idols of the cave are the illusions of the individual
man. . . . There are also illusions which seem to arise
by agreement and from men’s association with one
another, which we call idols of the marketplace . . . .
Finally, there are the illusions which have made their
homes in men’s minds from the various dogmas of
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different philosophies, and even from mistaken rules
of demonstration. These I call idols of the theater.”
Francis Bacon, Novum Organum (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000), 40–42.
17. Levinas defines desire as the disinterested quest for
otherness: “The metaphysical desire tends toward
something else entirely, toward the absolutely other. .
. . The metaphysical desire does not long to return,
for it is desire for a land not of our birth, for a land
foreign to every nature, which has not been our fa-
therland and to which we shall never betake our-
selves. . . . It is a desire that can not be satisfied” (To-
tality and Infinity, 33–34).
18. Popper makes a similar distinction when comparing
Cartesian epistemology—seeking to justify and to
prove—with Socratic epistemology aware of its lim-
its and fallibility: “Thus the doctrine of fallibility
should not be regarded as part of a pessimistic episte-
mology. This doctrine implies that we may seek for
truth, for objective truth, though more often than not
we may miss it by a wide margin. And it implies that
if we respect truth, we must search for it by persis-
tently searching for our errors: by indefatigable ra-
tional criticism, and self-criticism. . . . Cartesian
doubt we see is merely a maieutic instrument for es-
tablishing a criterion of truth and with it a way to se-
cure knowledge and wisdom. Yet for the Socrates of
the Apology, wisdom consisted in the awareness of
our limitations; in knowing how little we know, every
one of us. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations
(New York: Basic Books, 1962), 16.
19. This attitude of distrust was already acknowledged
by Popper as essential to the scientific attitude in
contrast with what he terms a mistaken attitude seek-
ing to justify or prove a hypothesis: “The Greeks’
discovery of the critical method gave rise at first to
the mistaken hope that it would lead to the solution of
all the great old problems; that it would establish cer-
tainty; that it would help to prove our theories, to jus-
tify them. But this hope was a residue of the dog-
matic way of thinking; in fact nothing can be justified
or proved (outside of mathematics or logics). . . .
Nevertheless the role of logical argument, or deduc-
tive logical reasoning, remains all important for the
critical approach; not because it allows us to prove
our theories, or to infer them from observation state-
ments, but because only by purely deductive reason-
ing is it possible for us to discover what our theories
imply and thus to criticize them effectively . . . there
is no more rational procedure than the method of trial
and error, of conjecture and refutation; of boldly pro-
posing theories, of trying our best to show that these
are erroneous, and of accepting them tentatively if
our critical efforts are unsuccessful” (ibid., 51).
20. Levinas is here very close to Kuhn’s descriptions of
normal science as incapable of acknowledging
anomalies which could, in fact, point to yet unknown
truths about the world: “Normal science . . . is predi-
cated on the assumption that the scientific commu-
nity knows what the world is like . . . normal science
for example often suppresses fundamental novelties
because they are necessarily subversive of its basic
commitments . . . sometimes a normal problem, one
that ought to be solvable by known rules and proce-
dures, resists the reiterated onslaught of the ablest
members of the group within whose competence it
falls . . . revealing an anomaly that cannot, despite re-
peated effort, be aligned with professional expecta-
tion. In these and other ways besides, normal science
repeatedly goes astray. And when it does—when,
that is, the profession can no longer evade anomalies
that subvert the existing tradition of scientific prac-
tice—then begin the extraordinary investigations
that lead the profession at last to a new set of commit-
ments, a new basis for the practice of science. They
are the tradition-shattering complements to the tradi-
tion-bound activity of normal science. Thomas
Kuhn, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, year),
162–63.
21. Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on
First Philosophy, 70–83.
22. Ibid., 83.
23. This was also Peirce’s intuition in comparing Carte-
sian epistemology—stemming from a solitary sub-
ject—to scientific epistemology which rests on a
community of thinkers: “The same formalism ap-
pears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to
this: “Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true.” If
I were really convinced, I should have done with rea-
soning and should require no test of certainty. But
thus to make single individuals absolute judges of
truth is most pernicious. The result is that metaphysi-
cians will all agree that metaphysics has reached a
pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical sci-
ences;—only they can agree to nothing else. In sci-
ences in which men come to agreement, when a the-
ory has been broached it is considered to be on
probation until this agreement is reached. After it is
reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle
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one, because there is no one left who doubts it. We in-
dividually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ulti-
mate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek
it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. . . .
Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences
in its methods. . . . Its reasoning should not form a
chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a
cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided
they are sufficiently numerous and intimately con-
nected.” “Consequences of Four Incapacities,” in
Collected Papers, 157.
24. See Plotinus, Enneads, IV, tractate 8, no. 4, trans.
Stephen Mackenna (London: Faber and Faber,
1956), 360–61.
25. Thorstein Veblen also also describes the alienated
standpoint of the exiled self as an epistemological
plus, in that it gives rise to what he calls “skeptical
animus” invaluable in paving new ways in science:
“The first requisite for constructive work in modern
science and indeed for any work of inquiry that shall
bring enduring results is a skeptical frame of mind.
The enterprising skeptic alone can be counted on to
further the increase of knowledge in any substantial
fashion. This will be found true both in the modern
sciences and in the field of scholarship at large. . . .
This intellectual enterprise that goes forward presup-
poses a degree of exemption from hard and fast pre-
conceptions, a skeptical animus, Unbefangenheit,
release from the dead hand of conventional finality.
[Such a man] is in a peculiarly fortunate position in
respect of this requisite immunity from the inhibi-
tions of intellectual quietism . . . for him as for other
men in the like case, the skepticism that goes to make
him an effectual factor in the increase and diffusion
of knowledge among men involves a loss of that
peace of mind that is the birthright of the safe and
sane quietist. He becomes a disturber of the intellec-
tual peace, but only at the cost of becoming an intel-
lectual wayfaring man, a wanderer in the intellectual
no man’s land, seeking another place to rest, farther
along the road, somewhere over the horizon.” Essays
in our Changing Order (New York: Viking Press,
1934), 226.
26. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans.
Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960),
127.
27. According to Husserl, the only way to avoid Des-
cartes’s solipsism while nevertheless acknowledging
the ego as the foundation of all experience is to
broaden that experience to include the other’s per-
ception of the world and as such, to arrive at a
genuinely objective and transcendent world: “It is an
essentially unique connectedness, an actual commu-
nity and precisely the one that makes transcenden-
tally possible the being of a world, a world of men
and things. . . . Openly endless Nature itself then be-
comes a Nature that includes an open plurality of
men. . . . To this community there naturally corre-
sponds, in transcendental concreteness, a similarly
open community of monads which we designate as
transcendental inter-subjectivity. . . . Manifestly it is
essentially necessary to the world constituted tran-
scendentally in me (and similarly necessary to the
world constituted in any community of monads that
is imaginable by me) that it be a world of men and
that, in each particular man, it be more or less per-
fectly constituted intrapsychically” (ibid., 129–30).
28. In the Symposium, Socrates introduces his speech
with a reference to Diotema, a stranger and a wise
woman. The juxtaposition is interesting and speaks
to a possible understanding of wisdom as that which,
by essence, must be taught by an other.
29. Such is the approach Paul Feyerabend proposes:
“This book proposes a thesis and draws conse-
quences from it. The thesis is: the events, procedures
and results that constitute the sciences have no com-
mon structure. . . . Successful research does not obey
general standards; it relies on one trick, now on an-
other. . . . It also follows that “non-scientific proce-
dures” cannot be pushed aside by argument . . . . A
consequence which I did not develop in my book but
which is closely connected with its basic thesis is that
there can be many different kinds of science. People
starting from different social backgrounds will ap-
proach the world in different ways and learn different
things about it. . . . First world science is one science
among many: by claiming to be more it ceases to be
an instrument of research and turns into a political
pressure group.” Against Method (London:
Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1988), 1–4.
30. According to Eduard Farber, such a different ap-
proach would include, beyond the method of
hypothetic-deduction, a mode of scientific investiga-
tion open to the workings of the mind in dreams and
visions: “We need Kekule’s testimony today as a
powerful reminder that chemistry advances not by
experiments alone but by a process in which dreams
and visions can play an important role. Chemists
seem to be particularly inclined to disparage any-
thing that is not experiment; perhaps they still have a
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guilt complex about alchemy and the speculative pe-
riods of the 17th and 18th centuries. In an attitude of
defense against speculation, J. C. Poggendorff re-
fused to publish Robert Mayer’s paper about ‘Forces
in Inanimate Nature’ (1842). This defensive position
was fortified by scientific standards of verification,
but it also contained an element of prejudice that has
been harmful. Results of experimental work were re-
jected when they would have required a change in
cherished assumptions.” “Dreams and Visions in a
Century of Chemistry,” in Introduction to the Philos-
ophy of Science, ed. Arthur Zucker (Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 36.
31. To this effect, Jaggar speaks of the voice of emotion
which, according to her, should also be heard in the
scientific endeavor if progress is to be made: “Posi-
tivism views value and emotions as alien invaders
that must be repelled by a stricter application of the
scientific method . . . rather than repressing emotion
in epistemology it is necessary to rethink the relation
between knowledge and emotion and construct a
conceptual model that demonstrates the mutally con-
stitutive rather than oppositional relation between
reason and emotion. Far from precluding the possi-
bility of reliable knowledge, emotions as well as
value must be shown as necessary to such knowl-
edge. Despite its classical antecedents and like the
ideal of disinterested enquiry, the ideal of dispassion-
ate enquiry is an impossible dream” (“Love and
Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,”
163).
